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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VOLUME VII Part Two Spring 1990
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT
OF NANCY CRUZAN
By M. Rose Gasner"
On January 11, 1983 Nancy Beth Cruzan, then 25 years
of age, was found lying near her overturned car. Paramedics
began efforts to revive her and transported her to Freeman
Hospital in Joplin, Missouri. There she was diagnosed as
having a lacerated liver and probable cerebral contusion
compounded by anoxia (deprivation of oxygen) estimated at
twelve to fourteen minutes. Nancy remained unconscious. A
gastrostomy tube was implanted on February 7th to supply
nutrition and hydration, and rehabilitation efforts began,
however, without success.' Nine months after the accident,
* Director of Legal Services, Society for the Right to Die. B.A., 1978, Dartmouth
College; J.D., 1983, Columbia University School of Law. This article is based on the Society's
amicus brief filed in the Cruzan case. The author wishes to thank William A. Prip for his
assistance, which was invaluable in both the preparation of this article and the brief.
1. Nancy Cruzan spent a month to six weeks in the Brady Building Rehabilitation Unit
of St. John's Hospital in Joplin, Missouri. There, the rehabilitation specialists tried to teach
her to sit up and to respond to her environment again. They engaged her in exercises
involving tactile, oral and auditory stimulation and passive range of motion. There was no
success. Testimony of Dr. Saad M. AI-Shatir, March 9, 1988, at 271-72, 278. Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
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Nancy was transferred to the Missouri Rehabilitation Center
in Mount Vernon, where she has remained in a persistent
vegetative state.' Her parents (as co-guardians) requested
that hospital employees discontinue the gastrostomy feedings?
The request was refused. In response, the Cruzans filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking judicial sanction of their
instruction.' The initial petition sought a ruling that Nancy
Cruzan has a common law right to be free of unwanted
treatment as well as a state and federal constitutional right to
privacy, which also protects the right to refuse medical
treatment.5
The trial court ruled for the guardians, finding that
there was clear and convincing evidence that Nancy "would
not wish to continue with nutrition and hydration,"6 that she
had a "right to liberty"7 and that to deny her co-guardians
authority to act would deprive her of equal protection of the
2. As described by the American Academy of Neurology:
the persistent vegetative state is a form of eyes-open permanent
unconsciousness in which the patient has periods of wakefulness and
physiological sleep/wake cycles, but at no time is the patient aware of
him- or herself or the environment. Neurologically, being awake but
unaware is the result of a functioning brainstem and the total loss of
cerebral cortical functioning.
Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and
Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125 (1989); Cranford,
The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS
CrR. REP. 27 (1988).
3. Joe and Joyce Cruzan, as Nancy Cruzan's co-guardians, wrote the Director of the
hospital on May 12, 1987, requesting the "cooperation of the Missouri Rehabilitation Center
in discontinuing the life support system that provides nutrition and hydration to our daughter."
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 432. The hospital administration responded that it would not remove
the tube because it would not be permitted under Missouri law. Testimony of Donald
Lampkins, March 10, 1988, at 341. Id. at 432 (Judgment of the trial court reprinted in the
opinion of Higgins, J., dissenting).
4. The petition was tiled in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Jasper County,
Missouri, Estate. (CV384-9P). Id. (Judgment of the trial court reprinted in the opinion of
Higgins, J., dissenting).
5. The petition alleged that each of these rights could be exercised on Nancy's behalf
by her parents as her co-guardians. Id. at 422 (majority opinion).
6. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 433. (trial court believed clear and convincing evidence was
presented) (judgment of the trial court reprinted in the opinion of Higgins, J., dissenting).
7. Id.
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law The state and Nancy's guardian ad litem appealed to
the Missouri Supreme Court, which reversed in a 4-3 decision.9
I. THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT DECISION
The decision by a narrow majority of the Missouri
Supreme Court was the first time an appellate court found
that under no circumstances could nutrition and hydration be
removed from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. Nine
appellate courts have held that it is permissible to end tube
feeding in these circumstances."
In rejecting the reasoning of some 50 appellate
decisions from 16 jurisdictions," the court scrupulously
examined and dismissed the existing theoretical bases of the
right to die. 2 It first looked at the common law right to
refuse treatment, and traced its development from a right of
individual automony, to the concept that a physician commits
a battery when a medical procedure is performed without the
patient's consent. 3 The next step in the analysis is that the
doctrine of informed consent implies a choice, and must
8. Id.
9. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
10. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re
Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399, reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 828 (1988); McConnell v. Beverly
Enterprises-Connecticut, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487
So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); In re Estate of
Longway, No. 67318 (II. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Jobes,
108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d
1, 51 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987).
11. The Missouri Supreme Court itself cited the cases from other jurisdictions, and then
stated, "[nlearly unanimously, those courts have found a way to allow persons wishing to die,
or those who seek the death of a ward, to meet the end sought." Cnzan, 760 S.W.2d at 412
n.4 (citing 50 cites from 17 jurisdictions: Arizona; California; Colorado; Connecticut;
Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Iowa; Louisiana; Maine; Massachusetts; Minnesota; New Jersey;
New York; Ohio; Pennsylvania; and Washington).
12. See id at 412-18.
13. "'[he doctrine of informed consent arose in recognition of the value society places
on a person's autonomy and as the primary vehicle by which a person can protect the
integrity of his body." Id. at 416-17.
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include a right to refuse consent as well. The court quoted
from the New Jersey case of In re Conroy, which stated that
"[t]he patient's ability to control his body integrity . . . is
significant only when one recognizes that his right also
encompasses a right to informed refusal."1
The court proceeded to entirely gut the applicability of
the common-law right to refuse treatment to incompetent
patients by stating that these decisions must be "informed."
The Court then recited the prerequisites to "informed consent"
for competent patients: (1) the patient must have the capacity
to reason and make judgments; (2) the decision must be
made voluntarily and without coercion; and (3) the patient
must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of
the treatment as well as the nature of the disease."
Most patient choices about the use of life sustaining
treatment must be made in advance, because the decisions are
usually carried out when the patient is incompetent. The
Missouri court found that "[i]t is definitionally impossible for
a person to make an informed decision--either to consent or
to refuse--under hypothetical circumstances, neither the
benefits nor the risks of treatment can be properly weighed or
fully appreciated." 6
The court next looked to the right to privacy. While
unequivocally stating that the Missouri Constitution did not
"support the right of a person to refuse medical treatment in
every circumstance,"17 with regard to federal protection, it only
stated that it had "grave doubts as to the applicability of
privacy rights to decisions to terminate the provision of food
and water to an incompetent patient."8 The court then went
on to make its most radical holding: no matter what the
14. Id. at 417 (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985)).
15. See id. at 417 (citing Wanzer, et al., The Physician's Responsibilities Toward Hopelessly
fII Patients, 310 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 955 (1984)).
16. Id at 417.
17. Id. at 417.
18. Id. at 418.
[Vol. VII
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nature of Nancy Cruzan's rights, the state's interest in
preservation of life is "unqualified" '19 and outweighs whatever
her preferences would be:
Given the fact that Nancy is alive and that the
burdens of her treatment are not excessive for
her, we do not believe her right to refuse
treatment, whether that right proceeds from a
constitutional right of privacy or a common law
right to refuse treatment, outweighs the immense,
clear fact of life in which the state maintains a
vital interest."
No other state has seen its "vital" interest in the same way."
Missouri saw its special interest in the preservation of life
reflected in two separate legislative statements: the Living
Will22 statute's exclusion of artificial nutrition and hydration
from medical treatment' and the preamble to the restrictive
abortion statute,2 4 which asserts a "right to life to all humans"'
19. Id. at 420.
20. Id. at 424.
21. The Missouri Court was very aware of its unique path:
[11n casting the balance between the patient's common law right to refuse
treatment/constitutional right to privacy and the state's interest in
preserving life, we acknowledge that the great majority of courts allow
the termination of life-sustaining treatment. In doing so, these courts
invariably find that the patient's right to refuse treatment outweighs the
state's interest in preserving life. In some cases, that result is the product
of a hopeless medical prognosis; in others, the court allows concerns with
the quality of life to discount the state's interest in life.
Id. at 420-21.
22. A "living will" is a writing in which a person sets forth his or her treatment
preferences in the event a certain medical condition is met. For those states with living will
statutes, see infra note 73, the specific execution requirements are defined by the statute,
as are the treatments that may be withheld or withdrawn, and the specific medical condition
that must be present. See generally Cohen, Living wills and Health Care Proxies, in 3
MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES Ch. 20 (1988).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1983 & Supp. 1990).
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.010, 188.015(7) (1983 & Supp. 1990).
25. Id. at § 188.010.
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and was tested in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on July 3, 1989,
marking the first time it has agreed to hear a "right to die"
case.2" Four previous cases have been denied certiorari, but
in all other cases, either the patient's right to have treatment
withheld was vindicated or the issue became moot.' While
the petition for certiorari vigorously argued that there was a
split among the circuits, the Missouri decision was more of an
aberration than a real trend reflecting a number of states
taking an absolute stand on the preservation of life.2
Not only was the Missouri decision an anomaly, but
Nancy Cruzan is not representative of most dying patients.'
Yet her plight raises many of the issues that arise in other
cases where life-sustaining treatment is sought to be withheld
or withdrawn. Approximately two million Americans die every
year.31 Eighty percent of those deaths take place in a hospital
26. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
27. Greenhouse, Does Right to Privacy Include Right to Die? Court to Decide, N.Y. Times,
July 25, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
28. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cen. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (patient's right to have respirator withdrawn upheld by state
court); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981) (formerly competent patient's right to have treatment withdrawn upheld, patient
who was never incompetent denied right); In re Estate of Prange, 166 11. App. 3d 1091, 520
N.E.2d 946 (1988), vacated, 122 III. Dec. 805, 527 N.E.2d 303, cert denied sub nom Murphy
v. Benson, 109 S.Ct. 229 (1988) (Illinois Supreme Court vacated lower court decision without
opinion, but patient had died after trial court hearing but before the decision was issued); In
Re Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988), appeal denied (July 28, 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399, reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 828
(1988) (patient's right to have tube feeding withdrawn upheld).
29. See Supra note 28.
30. There are approximately 5,000-10,000 patients in a persistent vegetative state in the
United States. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the
Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CT. REP. 27, 31 (Feb./Mar. 1988). Moreover, the majority of
deaths occur at older ages than Nancy's. In 1984, 70% of all deaths occurred in the age
group over 65. U.S. Cong.: Office of Technology Assessment, Life Sustaining Technologies
and the Elderly 77 (1987) [hereinafter Office of Technology Assessment Report]. President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, A Report on the Ethical, Medical,
and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 176-77 (1983) [hereinafter President's Commission
Report].
31. President's Commission Report, supra note 30, at 15. United States National Center
for Health Statistics, 37 MONTHLY VrrAL STATISmcs 6 (1989).
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or nursing home,32 and nearly all of those deaths involve a
decision by someone to do or not to do something which
could, for some time, avert the moment of that death and
prolong the dying process." "[T]he timing of death--once a
matter of fate--is now a matter of human choice."'
Nancy Cruzan's case presents a dramatic and poignant
example of the complex societal issue which many families
now face. Due to Nancy's youth and her condition, the use
of artificial life support (in her case, tube feeding) can
maintain her in her current condition long enough for her case
to proceed through the appellate courts and well beyond.35
Nancy's youth has two other effects which sharpen the issue
before the Supreme Court. It has permitted her to stabilize
into a condition that will not improve,' but in which she could
be maintained for thirty years. 7  In addition, since her
accident occurred when she was only 25 years old, her
statements about her personal preferences about life sustaining
treatment were not as extensive as they might have been if
she were older when the accident occurred.'
The question before the Supreme Court is who is
empowered to decide the course of Nancy Cruzan's medical
care, and whether that decision is of constitutional dimension.39
Her close family, whose loving motives were acknowledged by
32. President's Commission Report, supra note 30, at 17-18.
33. Id. at 16-18.
34. Office of Technology Assessment Report, supra note 30, at 41 (1987).
35. President's Commission Report, supra note 30, at 71. Patients can survive in this
condition for five, ten or twenty years. The factors that affect the duration of time are 1)
age, -because elderly patients develop more medical complications; 2) economic, family and
institutional factors that can affect the quality of care; 3) the natural resistance of the body
and 4) relevant views on the propriety of stopping treatment. Cranford, supra note 2, at 31.
36. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (en banc 1988).
37. Id.
38. A study by the Citizen's Committee on Biomedical Ethics revealed that while 10%
of those respondents between the ages of 15-29 had a living will, 35% of those over 65 had
one. The Citizens' Committee on Biomedical Ethics, Your Health, Your Choices, Whose
Decisions? at 13 (1988) (available from The Citizens' Committee on Biomedical Ethics, Inc.,
Summit, N.J.).
39. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 408, petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3636 (U.S. Mar. 13,
1989) (No. 88-1503), cert granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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the Missouri Supreme Court,' knows she would not want to
be sustained in this condition.4 The Missouri decision,
however, stripped them of any input into their daughter's care
and condemned them to a thirty year bedside vigil in order to
protect unnamed and unspecified others."
Along with over 20 other amici, representing 49
different individuals and groups, the Society for the Right to
Die argued that Nancy Cruzan has a right to an individualized
medical decision consistent with her constitutional rights to
self-determination, privacy and liberty. 3 These rights were not
obliterated when the emergency medical team "saved" her at
the scene of the automobile accident.
While other courts have grappled with the question of
standards for deciding medical care for incompetent patients,
no other court renounced individuality by handing over the
40. Crmzan, 760 S.W.2d at 412.
41. Id. at 422.
42. The court seemed to by very concerned with a generalized group of "others": "[a]nd
we must remember that we decided this case not only for Nancy, but for many, many others
who may not be surrounded by the loving family with which she is blessed." Id at 412.
43. Those who filed were Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; SSM Health Care
System; St. Joseph Health System; Mercy Health System; Catholic Health Corporation; Rev.
James J. McCartney, O.S.A., Ph.D.; Rev. Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., J.C.D.; Center for Health
Care Ethics; St. Louis University Medical Center, AIDS Civil Rights Project; The National
Hospice Organization; General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church;
American Geriatrics Society; McConnell Family; Barbara Burgoon and Ruth Fields (National
Senior Citizens Law Center); Senior Citizens Law Project--Legal Aid Bureau; Legal Services
for Senior Citizens--Legal Aid Bureau; the American Nurses Association and the American
Association of Nurse Attorneys; Society of Critical Care Medicine, Presbyterian-University
Hospital and the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania; American Academy of
Neurology; American Hospice Organization; American Hospital Association; Wisconsin
Bioethicists and Other Health Professionals; Missouri Hospitals, Hospital Ethics Committees,
Medical Schools, Hospital Chaplains, Hospice Organizations and Law Professors; Colorado
Hospital Association, Association of Senior Citizens, Inc., Center for Health Policy, University
of Colorado at Denver, Children's Health Corporation, Colorado Chapter--AA Family
Physicians; Colorado Hospital Association, Colorado Medical Society; Craig Hospital;
Professor Frank March; ACLU Foundation of Colorado; Colorado Department of Social
Services; Rose Medical Center, Spalding Rehabilitation Hospital, and the Swedish Medical
Center, National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys; American Medical Association; American
Association of Neurological Surgeons, and Missouri State Medical Association; Concern for
Dying; Society for the Right to Die; and the American College of Physicians.
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power to decide to the state." The Missouri Supreme Court
crossed the constitutional line, by not merely regulating
medical decisionmaking, but forbidding a particular medical
decision, in violation of Nancy Cruzan's constitutional rights.
II. NANCY CRUZAN HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT To AN INVIDUALIZED DECISION
ABOUT HER MEDICAL TREATMENT
The medical situation which confronts Nancy Cruzan
(long term maintenance in a permanently unconscious state)
is new, but the rights sought to be enforced on her behalf are
long-standing and fundamental. The Supreme Court
articulated the right of self-determination as far back as 1891:
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded
by the common law, than the right of control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference by others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law."45  When the
government compels medical treatment it violates "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men,"" which is the "right to be let alone. 47
The right to control one's medical course and be free
of unwanted treatment is a fundamental personal right
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' which is "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' As stated by
the Washington Supreme Court: "[t]he decision by the
incurably ill to forego medical treatment and allow the natural
44. Cf., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (surrogate decision-maker may
exercise substituted judgment on behalf of patient, and determine whether the patient would
want continued artificial feeding, taking into account everything known) with In re Westchester
County Medical Center, in the matter of Mary O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988) (petitioner must show that the patient had made a specific choice to
forego medical treatment while competent.
45. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
46. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937) and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 464 (1977)).
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processes of death to follow their inevitable course is so
manifestly a 'fundamental' decision in their lives, that it is
virtually inconceivable that the right to privacy would not
apply to it." 9 The federal constitutional dimension of the right
to refuse medical treatment has been recognized by numerous
state and federal courts."
At issue in Nancy Cruzan's case is whether the
government can compel medical treatment in violation of two
interests long recognized as worthy of constitutional protection.
The first is the interest in the protection of the bodily integrity
of the individual, of which it has been said that forced surgery
"damages the individual's sense of personal privacy and
security." t The second unconstitutional intrusion arises as a
result of Nancy's incompetence, and is the substitution of the
state as decision-maker for the patient who can no longer
express her own wishes, entering into the usually sacrosanct
realm of family privacy. 2
49. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983) (quoting In re Eichner,
73 A.D.2d 431, 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), affd sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)).
50. See, e.g, McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises, 209 Conn. 992, 701, 553 A.2d 596, 600
(1989); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154
Ariz. 207, 214, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 348, 529 A.2d 404, 410
(1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633
(1986); Bartling v. Superior Court (Gleddale Adventist Medical Center), 163 Cal. App. 3d
186,195, 2098 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1984); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center,
68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ct. Com. PI. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospitial, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 446,
321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983),
modified, In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re
Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 38-
42, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64, cert. denied sub non Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976),
overrded in par, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
51. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 174 (1951) (forced stomach pumping "offensive to human dignity").
52. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) (Presumption that a child born
to a married women living with her husband is the child of the marriage, and a child does
not have a due process right to maintain a filial relationship with the natural father and the
husband); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (If only one parent has established a
custodial relationship with the child, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent the state
from giving the parents different legal rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(Fundamental right to marital privacy); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (The
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The Supreme Court has recognized the limits of
government intrusion in the basic areas of individual liberty,
family privacy and bodily integrity in the context of forced
surgical examination," forced stomach pumping,54 marriage,"
5
contraception,56 procreation," child rearing and education, 8
and family relationships. 9 Mandating a particular form of
medical treatment to an incompetent patient over the
objections of her family is a similarly offensive and a
potentially limitless exercise of government power.
Our choices about how to deal with incurable and
irreversible sickness are as personal and fundamental as our
decisions about how to rear children or who to marry.
Decisions to forgo medical treatment can be premised on such
varying rationales as a religious belief in spiritual life after
death, a personal desire to spare one's family prolonged
agony, an abhorrence of dependence or helplessness or a
specific choice to leave one's money for the education of
grandchildren, rather than the profits of a nursing home. The
protection of these intensely personal, ethical and religious
values, usually formed and fostered within the family, is firmly
embedded within our constitutional values. The Supreme
Court recently stated that these cases finding a protected
liberty interest "rest ...upon the historic respect--indeed,
sanctity would not be too strong a term--traditionally accorded
to the relationships that develop within the unitary family."'
This unbroken line of cases beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska,6
First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to educate one's children as one sees
fit).
53. Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
54. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
55. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
56. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
57. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
59. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
60. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1989).
61. Meyer, 762 U.S. at 399-401.
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and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,62 consistently respect a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter."'
Nancy Cruzan's incompetency does not render her any
less of a human being entitled to an individualized decision
about her care, made by the people who knew her and love
her. As every other court has held, the right to refuse
treatment is not lost merely because the "noncognitive and
vegetative condition of the patient prevents a conscious
exercise of the choice to refuse further extraordinary
treatment."' The Missouri Supreme Court, by ordering
unlimited treatment for all incompetent patients, refused to
recognize that patients are individuals with a history and a
value system of their own:
[m]edical choices are private, regardless of
whether a patient is able to make them
personally or must rely on a surrogate. They are
not to be decided by societal standards of
reasonableness or normalcy. Rather it is the
patient's preferences-formed by his or her unique
personal experiences-that should control.'
The right to a personalized decision, carried out by
one's family or loved ones, is supported both by medical ethics
and public opinion." The medical establishment, represented
by the American Medical Association, the American Academy
of Neurology and the American College of Physicians, among
62. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
63. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
64. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla.
1984). See also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr.
840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988).
65. In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 373, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (1987).
66. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
[Vol. VII
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others, speak with one voice on this issue.67 The other amicus
briefs filed in the case further demonstrated that unanimity,
since groups as wide ranging as the American Hospital
Association, the Lutheran Church, the American Nurses
Association, and many others filed as well."
An overwhelming majority of citizens similarly believe
strongly that the right to make medical decisions includes a
right to forgo life sustaining treatment and that choices about
these issues should remain within the family." A 1986
American Medical Association poll indiciated that 73% of the
1,510 respondents favored "withdrawing life support systems,
including food and water, from hopelessly ill or irreversibly
comatose patients if they or their family request it."'  A
67. The American Medical Association has issued an Opinion stating, in part:
Even if death is not imminent but a patient is beyond doubt permanently
unconscious, and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy
of the diagnosis, it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life-
prolonging medical treatment. . . . The social commitment of the
physician is to sustain life and relieve suffering. Where the performance
of one duty conflicts with the other, the preferences of the patient should
prevail. If the patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf and did
not previously indicate his preferences, the family or other surrogate
decisionmaker, in concert with the physician, must act in the best interest
of the patient....
American Medical Association Council, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical
Treatmen, in Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion 2.18
(1986). The statement of the American Academy of Neurology provides:
[T]he decision to discontinue [the artificial provision of fluid and
nutrition] should be made in the same manner as other medical decisions,
i.e., based on a careful evaluation of the patient's diagnosis and prognosis,
the prospective benefits and burdens of the treatment, and the stated
preferences of the patient and family.
American Academy of Neurology, Position of the American Acadamy of Neurology on Certain
Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39
NEUROLOGY 123, 125 (1989). The brief submitted by the American College of Physicians
concluded, "It]he question before the Court today is whether Nancy Cruzan's right to bodily
integrity, which includes her fight to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, is outweighed
by some compelling state interest. The answer is no." Brief of American College of
Physicians as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 28, Cruzan v. Harmon, 109 S. Ct.
495 (1989).
68. See supra note 43.
69. See infra notes 70-72.
70. American Medical Association, Public Opinion on Health Care Issues-1986 Chicago,
Illinois (1986). See In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 418 n.ll, 529 A.2d 434, 446 n.ll (1987) (citing
American Medical Association Public Opinion Poll on Life Support Withdrawal Issues 1986))
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teleconference poll moderated by Ted Koppel revealed that
79% of those polled believe that quality of life determinations
should be considered in the decision of whether to use life-
sustaining technology, and 70% believe that the immediate
family, not the courts, should decide in the case of an
incompetent patient." A very recent survey conducted by the
Colorado Graduate School of Public Affairs revealed that 85%
of those surveyed would not want to have their life maintained
with artificial feeding if they became permanently unconscious
and could not eat normally.'
III. THE STATES HAVE PROTECTED
PATIENT CHOICE THROUGH STATUTES
AND COURT DECISIONS
In contrast to Missouri's foreclosure of patient choice,
other states have been extremely protective of the individual's
right to die without unwanted medical treatment. Forty-one
states and the District of Columbia have living will laws, which
permit an individual to execute a document to express his or
her own wishes regarding death-prolonging treatment.73
(analyzed in Poll Backs Ending Life Support in Some Cases, N.Y Times Nov. 29, 1986, at 32,
col. 1).
71. 90% in Poll Back Patients' Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1986, at C10, col 2.
72. Fort Collins Coloradoan, Sept. 29, 1988, at 1. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted
the public's support for private decisionmaking in Jobes, 108 NJ. at 418 n.ll, 529 A.2d at 446
n.ll.
73. States with "Living Will" (also called "natural death," "right to die," or "rights of the
terminally ill") statutes are: Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE § 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984);
Alaska Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (1986); Arizona Medical
Treatment Decision Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201 (1986); Arkansas Rights of the
Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-201 (1987);
California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1989);
Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(7) (1989);
Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570-575 (West
1989); Delaware Death with Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 -09 (1983); Florida
Life Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 -.15 (West 1986); Georgia Natural
Death Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1984); Hawaii Medical Treatments Decisions
Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-1 to -27 (1988); Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§
39-4501-4508 (1989); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 701 to 710
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Such statutes typically define the conditions under which
the document becomes effective, which are usually that the
patient must be in a "terminal condition."'74 The definition of
"terminal" varies, sometimes requiring "imminent" death,75 with
or without life-sustaining treatment, and sometimes including
the "permanently unconscious."'7 These statutes either list the
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Indiana Living Wills and Life Prolonging Procedures Act, IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1-22 (Burns 1989); Iowa Life Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 144A.2(5) (West 1989); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. 65-28, 101-109
(1985); Kentucky Living Will Act, KY. AmrS, ch. 122 (H.B. 113)(1990) Louisiana Life-
Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1.10 (West 1989); Maine
Living Wills, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 2925 - 2931 (1985); Maryland Life-Sustaining
Procedures Act, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1988); Minnesota Adult
Health Care Decisions Act, MINN. STAT. § 145B.03 (1989); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life
Saving Mechanisms Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101-121 (1988); Missouri Uniform Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010.055 (1986); Montana Living Will Act,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-101 (1987); Nevada Witholding or Withdrawal of Life Sustaining
Procedures Act, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1986); New Hampshire Terminal Care
Document Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1:16 (1988); New Mexico Right to Die Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320-322 (1985); North Dakota Uniform Rights of Terminally II Act, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.4 (1989); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103
(West 1989); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605
127.650 (1989); South Carolina Death with Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10-160
(Law. Co-op. 1988); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-
101-110 (1988); Texas Natural Death Act, TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 672.001 (Vernon
1989); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101-1118
(1988); Vermont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 5251-5262 (1987);
Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981.2992 (1989); Washington Natural
Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010.905 (1989); West Virginia Natural Death
Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1-10 (1985); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
154.01.15 (West 1989) Wyoming Living Will Act, WYo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101-109 (1988).
74. See, e.g., Oregon's definition of a terminal condition as "[ain incurable condition
caused by injury, disease or illness which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining
procedures would within reasonable medical judgment produce death, and where the
application of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the
patient." Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.605(6)
(1989).
75. See, e.g., Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. ANN. CODE § 5-601(g) (Supp.
1990), which defines a "terminal condition" as "[a~n incurable condition of a patient caused
by injury, disease, or illness which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, makes death
imminent and from which, despite the application of life-sustaining procedures, there can be
no recovery." Id.
76. See, e.g., Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act,
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201(7) (9) (11) (Supp. 1989), which defines a "qualified patient"
as either "terminally ill" or "permanently unconscious" and permits individuals "of sound mind
of eighteen (18) or more years ... to execute a declaration to indicate their treatment
choices in either or both conditions." Id. at 20-17-202(a).
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medical procedures that fall within the definition of "life-
prolonging" treatments" or provide general definitions such as
"any medical procedure or intervention which, in the judgment
of the attending physician if applied to a qualified patient,
would serve only to prolong the dying process."' 8  The
legislation frequently includes specific witnessing procedures'
and other execution requirements.' As a practical matter, the
inclusion of clear immunity from civil or criminal liability for
the health care providers who honor the documents is a
feature that adds immeasurably to acceptance of the
documents by the health care community.
An alternative method of statutory protection for the
right to refuse treatment is the creation of a durable power of
attorney for health care decisions. Twenty-six jurisdictions
allow the appointment of an individual to make decisions
regarding life-sustaining treatment upon the incompetence of
the principal, either by an explicit statute or by judicial
77. See, e.g., Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(d) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1989):
'Death delaying procedure' means any medical procedure or intervention
which, when applied to a qualified patient, in the judgment of the
attending physician would serve only to postpone the moment of death.
In appropriate circumstances, such procedures include, but are not limited
to, assisted ventilation, artificial kidney treatments, intravenous feeding
or medication, blood transfusions, tube feeding and other procedures of
greater or lesser magnitude that serve only to delay death ....
Id.
78. Arizona Medical Treatment Decisions Act, ARpz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4)
(1986). See also Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, NEv.
REV. STAT. § 449.570 (Supp.1988). "[L]ife-sustaining procedure" means a medical procedure
which utilizes mechanical or other artificial methods to sustain, restore or supplant a vital
function. The term does not include medication or procedures necessary to alleviate pain.
Id.
79. See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103(B) (West
Supp. 1989), which specifies that witnesses may not be under twenty-one years of age, related
to the declarant by blood or marriage, financally responsible for the medical care of the
declarant, entitled to any portion of the estate, the attending physician, an employee of the
physician or health care facility, another patient in the same health care facility, or a person
who has a claim against the estate. Id.
80. Some statutes require that the document be notarized. See, e.g., Hawaii Medical
Treatment Decisions Act, HAW. REv. STAT. § 327D-3 (Supp. 1988).
81. See generally Cohen, "Living Wills and Health Care Proxies," 3 MURPHYS WILL
CLAUSES Ch. 20 (1988).
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interpretationY The statutes range from providing a total
grant of authority to the agent' to permitting only certain
circumscribed types of decisions.' Use of both living wills and
durable powers of attorney for health care, an option available
in many states, allows an individual to make known his or her
own wishes known regarding artificial life support and permits
the individual to indicate who would be best suited to
communicate those treatment preferences to the health care
providers, interpreting and supplementing the instructions if
necessary.
While organizations such as the Society for the Right
to Die advocate advance planning to ensure respect of
individual treatment choices, it is common wisdom that people
do not like to contemplate their own death.' Many people
delay writing a property will, and die intestate, so it is not
surprising that the available data indicates that a relatively
small number of people (9%) execute advance directives or
living wills and formally address the more emotional decision
about how they would wish treatment decisions that precede
82. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5501-5502 (1975), as interpreted by Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); CAL. CiV. CODE § 2430-2444 (West 1989);
COL. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (1987), as interpreted by In re Rodas, No. 86PR139 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Mesa County Jan. 22, 1987, as modified, April 3, 1987) (Buss, J.); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2201-2213 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 551D-2, 327D-26 (1989); ILL_ ANN. STAT. ch. 110
1/2, § 804-1 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.705 (West 1988); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1987); MD. EST & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1989), MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.800-.860 (1987); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 46: 2B-8, -9 (West 1989) as interpreted by In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 529 A.2d
419 (1987); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1501 (McKinney 1989), as interpreted by In re
Westchester County Med. Center (O'Conner), 72 N.Y.2d 517, 631 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886 (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11-.17 (Anderson 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505-
.585 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1987); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
4590H-1 (Vernon 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3451-3467 (1988).
83. See, e.g., Vermont Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care Act, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, §§ 3451 to 3467 (Supp. 1988).
84. See, e.g., Ohio Power of Attorney Act for Health Care, OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. §§
1337.11 - 1337.17 (Supp. 1989) (S.B. 13, signed June 28, 1989) (limits decision making by
an agent to situations where death is "imminent," regardless of the application of life-
sustaining procedures, and also forbids any decisions to withhold artificial nutrition and
hydration unless the provision unless the provision of artificial feeding is painful or it could
not be assimilated by the patient).
85. D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING at 277 (1981).
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their death to be handled, when they can no longer speak for
themselves. '
In response to the fact that most people do not have
living wills, but will nonetheless be the subject of medical
decisions when incompetent, thirteen states have enacted
statutory procedures which, like the laws of intestacy, fill the
gap between the theory of advance planning and the everyday
reality of preferring to avoid thoughts of death."
Those states have enacted statutory surrogate decision-
making provisions which authorize certain individuals to make
treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients." The
list of individuals, in an order of priority, reflects a legislative
determination of the surrogates most people would choose,
86. Emmanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document,
261 J. A.M.A. 3288 (1989).
87. Arkansas Rights of the Terminally III or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 20-17-214 (1987); Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1989); Florida Life Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.07 (West 1986); Iowa Life Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7
(West Supp. 1986); Louisiana Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1989); Maine Uniform Rights of the Terminally
III Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18a, §§ 5-70 to 714 (H.B. 1497, signed April 17, 1990);
New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-708.1 (1986): North Carolina Right to
Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-322 (1985); Oregon Rights with Respect to
Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083 (1985); Texas Natural Death Act, TEX. REV.
CJv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-§ 4C (Vernon Supp. 1989); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105(2) (Supp 1989); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE
§ 54:1-2986 (1988); District of Columbia, Health Care Decisions Act of 1988, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11 (1988); See also Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act, § 7, 9A U.L.A. 456
(as amended 1989).
88. cf.
When an Incompetent Person who has not Executed a Document under
the Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7 (1978), is
certified as terminally ill or in an irreversible coma under the procedures
described in § 24-7-5, a physician may remove maintenance medical
treatment from that person when all family members who can be
contacted through reasonable diligence agree in good faith that the
patient, if competent, would choose to forego that treatment.
New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §24-7-8.1 (1986), with
In the absence of a durable power of attorney for health care and
provided that the incapacity of the principle has been :certified in
accordance with § 21-2204 of the Dist. of Columbia Health Care
Decisions Act of 1988, the following individuals ... shall be authorized
to grant, refuse or withdraw consent on behalf of the patient with respect
to the provision of any health-care service, treatment, or procedure.
District of Columbia Health Care Decisions Act of 1988, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (1988).
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and guides the health care team to the family or others who
should be consulted on questions of life sustaining treatment."
Much like the law of disposition of property, those individuals
who wish to vary the legislative presumption can leave their
own instructions by executing a living will or durable power of
attorney for health care.
State courts (but for Missouri) have supplemented these
statutory rights by developing a body of case law that relies on
common law, federal and/or state constitutional principles and
has consistently endorsed various forms of advocacy by family
members on behalf of incompetent patients.' While living
wills and durable powers of attorney provide mechanisms for
the simpler and less controversial decisions, the courts have
vigorously protected patients' rights to decline artificial life
support outside these statutory schemes.9'
Twenty-eight jurisdictions have case law finding that the
state had no interest which would outweigh an individual's
right to forgo artificial life support.' Depending on the state,
89. Arkansas sets the priority list as follows: 1) the legal guardian of the patient, if one
has been appointed; 2) the parent of the patient, for an unmarried patient under the age of
eighteen; 3) the patient's spouse; 4) the patient's adult child, or, if there is more than one,
then a majority of the patient's children participating in the decision; 5) the parents of a
patient over the age of eighteen; 6) the patient's adult sibling, or if there is more than one,
then a majority of the patient's adult siblings [articipating in the decision; 7) persons standing
in loco parentis to the patient; and 8) a majority of the patient's adult heirs at law who
participate in the decision. Arkansas Rights of the Terminally II or Permanently Unconscious
Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Supp. 1987).
90. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Conservatorship
of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), re denied (July
28, 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988), reh'g denied,109 S. Ct. 828 (1988); McConnell
v. Beverly Enterprises, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.
2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); In re Gardner, 534
A.2d 947, (Me.1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d
626 (1986): In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); Gray v. Romero, 697 F. Supp.
580 (D. R.I. 1988).
91. Id.
92. Since the 1976 Quinlan case, twenty-eight jurisdictions have issued "right-to-die"
rulings authorizing the termination of life support for patients in a variety of circumstances.
See, e.g., Arizona: Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 207, 741 P.2d at 674; California: Drabick, 200 Cal.
App. 3d at 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 840; Colorado: In re Rodas, No. 86PR139 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Mesa County Jan. 22, 1987, as modified, April 3, 1987) (Buss, J.); Connecticut: McConnell,
209 Conn. at 692, 553 A.2d at 596; Delaware: Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.
2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); District of Columbia: Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital,
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this body of law is at varying stages of development. For
example, New Jersey's Supreme Court has addressed decision-
making for the competent, 93 the permanently unconscious,'
and the minimally conscious patient." It has developed a
judicially mandated role in the decision-making process for
prognosis or ethics committees within hospitals, and has also
provided for an oversight role for the State Ombudsman for
nursing home residents over the age of sixty.'
An initial ruling in Massachusetts implying that court
approval was needed for all refusal of life-support decisions'
was refined, so that court authorization is only required if the
medical treatment proposed offers some hope of leading to a
602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985); Florida: John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Georgia: In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716
(1984); Hawaii: Wilcox v. Hawaii, No. 860116 (5th Cir. 1986); Illinois: In re Estate of
Longeway, No. 67318 (III. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 1989); Iowa: Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Louisiana: In re PVW, 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); Maine: In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Massachusetts: Brophy, 398 Mass. at 417, 497 N.E.2d at
626; Michigan: In re Culham, No. 87-340537-AZ (Mich. Cir. C,. Oakland County Dec. 15,
1987) (Breck, J.); Minnesota: In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Mirnn. 1984); New Jersey: In
re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); New York: In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); North Dakota: In re Bayer,
No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 11, and Dec. 11, 1987) (Riskedahl, J.); Ohio:
Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ct. Com. Pl.
1980); Oregon: Evans v. District Attorney of Douglas County, No. E82-2173 (Ore. Cir. Ct.
Douglas County Dec. 13, 1982); Pennsylvania: In re Jane Doe, 16 Phila. 229 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. 1987); Rhode Island: Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Tennessee: Jane
Doe v. Wilson, No. 90-364-II (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Davidson County Feb. 16, 1990) (Williams, J.);
Texas: In re Guardianship Estate of Peterson, No. El17,982 (Texas Dist. Ct. Jefferson County,
Aug. 4, 1983); Virginia: Hazelton Isicl v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. Ct. Op.
414 (Aspen 1987) (Va. Cir. Ct. Fairfax County 1986) (Sept. 2, 1986) (Fortkort, J.), appeal
denied, No. 860814 (Va. Sept. 2, 1986); Washington: In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash.
2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (1988); Wisconsin: In re Guardianship
of Welch, No. 89GN30 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Eau Claire County June 21, 1989).
93. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
94. See Jobes, 108 N.J: at 394, 529 A.2d at 434; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647,
cert. denied sub nom Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), overruled in part, In re
Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
95. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 321, 486 A.2d at 1209; In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987).
96. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647, cen denied sub nor. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), overruled in part, Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d at 1209 (1985);
In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
97. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977).
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"remission of symptoms enabling a return towards a normal
functioning integrated existence."' Other courts have clearly
held that judicial approval is not required, absent some
conflict between the interested parties."
The state judicial, legislative and health care systems
are going to have to continue to establish the procedural
framework for exercising the right to forgo medical treatment.
Workable procedures to address the use of medical technology
for the hopelessly ill will consistently be refined; As the states
seek to accommodate the interests of all concerned, most have
been mindful of the spirit expressed by the Florida Second
District Court of Appeal when it established a process under
which life support could be ended:
[T]he remedy exists to fulfill a right of privacy.
Thus, the procedures to invoke and enforce this
right should be as private as the state's
competing interests can permit for such a
delicate decision.
We obviously do a poor job of protecting
the patient's right of privacy by discussing the
details of her medical condition and the nature
of her family structure in a highly publicized
decision which will be preserved for posterity."°'
The Missouri Supreme Court stood alone when it refused to
acknowledge that a procedure was needed, and that forbiding
the Cruzan's decision was not a solution. This departure from
national medical and legal standards raises the specter of a
new and macabre type of forum shopping--transferring
98. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
99. See Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988), appeal denied (Cal. July 28, 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); see also
In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In.re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
100. In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 268-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), appealfiled, Case
No. 74,1747 (1989).
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patients across state lines so they will be allowed to die.
IV. THE STATE's LEGITIMATE INTEREST
IN PREVENTING ABUSE CANNOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BURDEN THE
RIGHT To FORGO TREATMENT
The Missouri Supreme Court's view of the State
interest in the preservation of life was defined as "unqualified,"
so that no individual could compete.'' Four state interests
were articulated in the case law early in its development and
have been repeatedly recited: (1) the preservation of life; (2)
the protection of third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide
and (4) the protection of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession."°  Despite their constant recitation, no other state
court has ever found one of these interests to prevail. 3
When it reversed the lower court decison, the Missouri
Supreme Court saw the state's interest in the preservation of
life as outweighing any privacy or liberty rights that Nancy
Cruzan might have."° By a 4-3 vote, it twisted the state's
101. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (Mo. 1988) (en bane).
102. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216-18, 741 P.2d
683 (Ariz. 1987); In re McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d
947, 955, (Me. 1987); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348-49, 529 A.2d 404, 410-11 (N.J. 1987);
Gray by Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D. R.I. 1988).
103. Since their initial articulation in 1977, considerable attention has been paid to the
issue of withholding and withdrawing treatment, and these states interests are now not
necessarily the best articulation of governmental concerns. National organizations such as the
American Medical Association and the American Academy of Neurology have taken public
policy stances that clarify their position only within the last few years. As previously noted,
it is now clear that the ethical integrity of the medical profession is fostered by honoring
patients wishes to forgo treatment, and that it is ethically appropriate to withhold or withdraw
tube feeding from the permanently unconscious, consistent with their own previously stated
wishes or their family's request. See generally Wanzer, The Physician and the Hopelessly Ill
Patient: A Second Look, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844 (1989). None of the other traditional
state interests are implicated here. Nancy has no dependents, so there are no third parties
to be protected. Nor is the State's interest in the prevention of suicide an issue. As the
courts have repeatedly held, forgoing life sustaining medical treatment cannot be considered
suicide. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 350, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987).
104. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
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interest in preventing abuse and created a situation in which
continued forced treatment constitutes a more egregious form
of abuse, with no concomitant state justification or benefit.t"
The state should protect its citizenry from abuse by
regulating the way decisions are made, but cannot demand
that patients accept its view of the appropriate medical
decisons. Patients need protection from decisions made in
ignorance or bad faith, but those protections can be provided
institutionally, with courts as a last resort."°  A rule of law
which speaks to eliminating all potential abuses by requiring
unwanted treatment unfairly burdens the vast majority of
well-meaning families, and does not take into account the
checks and balances within the medical world. Attending
physicians are required to conform to nationally accepted
ethical standards, institutional committees review cases,
confirming opinions can be sought, and judicial review in cases
of conflict is always a possibility. 7
105. The court's concern with the potential for abuse for the general population of
incompetent patients appeared a number of times in the decision.
The state's concern with the sanctity of life rests on the principle that
life is precious and worthy of preservation without regard to its quality.
This latter concern is especially important when considering a person who
has lost the ability to direct her medical treatment. In such a
circumstance, we must tread carefully, with due regard for those
incompetent persons whose wishes are unknowable but who would, if
able, choose to continue life-sustaining treatment. Any substantive
principle of law which we adopt must also provide shelter for those who
would choose to live -- if able to choose -- despite the inconvenience that
choice might cause others.
Id at 419. Similarly, "[wlere quality of life at issue, persons with all manners of handicaps
might find the state seeking to terminate their lives. Instead, the state's interest is 'in life;
that interest is unqualified." Id. at 420.
106. Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained from Families of Adult Patients to
Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J. A.M.A 229, 234 (1987); Rhoden, Litigating Life and
Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 443-45 (1988).
107. Institutional methods of resolving disputes have been recognized by both the courts
and the bioethical and legal literature. See supra note 106; In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 422-
23, 529 A.2d 434, 448-49 (1987); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 127, 660 P.2d 738, 746
(1983); Guidelines on the Termination of Treatment and the Care of the Dying, HASTINGS
CENTER 31-33 (1987). Dispute resolution mechanisims are also present within many
institutions; one-half to three-quarters of all hospitals now have ethics committees, as do some
nursing homes. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Life Sustaining Technologies
and the Elderly, 63 (1987). See supra note 106. One-half to three-quarters of all hospitals
now have ethics committees, as do some nursing homes. U.S Congress: Office of Technology
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
By finding such an unrestricted state interest, the
Missouri Supreme Court did not merely regulate the decision-
making process for Nancy Cruzan; it decided that Nancy
Cruzan must accept treatment."l To withstand constitutional
scrutiny, a limitation on an individual's privacy or liberty rights
must be "necessary to achievement of a compelling state
interest."'" The Missouri Supreme Court's description of the
state interest in the "preservation of life," carried to its
conclusion, means that as a society, we would have to
maintain all biological existence indefinitely."' The court
purported to limit the rights of Nancy Cruzan to forgo
treatment on three separate grounds: her condition, the
treatment at issue, and the evidence of her wishes."' None
of these reasons meets the "compelling state interest" test,"2
and each unduly burdens a fundamental right to self
determination, privacy and liberty."3 By ordering treatment
for Nancy Cruzan in contravention of her family's view of
what her wishes would be, Missouri crossed the constitutional
line which protects the citizenry from governmental
interference in these extraordinarily personal and troubling
dilemmas.
Assessment, Life Sustaining Technologies and the Elderly 63 (1987).
108. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
109. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972) (emphasis added).
110. As one commentator noted,
[e]liminating quality of life considerations from decisions about life-
sustaining treatment permits treatment to proceed regardless of the pain
it inflicts, how burdensome it becomes, or how futile it proves to be.
Once initiated, treatment must continue until death is imminent, leaving
patients the option to refuse useless care only, because the state's
disinterest in quality of life requires it to remain indifferent to the
patient's experience of treatment. Patients thereby become things and
the individual's interest in a natural death is subsumed under a quest
for perpetual life.
Scofield, The Calculus of Consent, Hastings Center Report (Jan./Feb. 1990).
111. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 422-24.
112. See supra note 109.
113. See supra note 50.
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A. The Missouri Supreme Court Unconstitutionally Burdened
the Right to Forgo Medical Treatment by Limiting the
Exercise of the Right to Certain Medical Conditions
Nancy Cruzan lies in a persistent vegetative state, a
condition which the Missouri Supreme Court found
distinguished the rights at issue from those of competent
patients or the terminally ill."4
Yet, the Missouri court's view of a persistent vegetative
state is at odds with other jurisdictions."5 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated, it is "difficult to conceive of a case in
which the state could have an interest strong enough to
subordinate a patient's right to choose not to be artificially
sustained in a persistent vegetative state.""" While the state
has a legitimate and important interest in protecting its most
vulnerable and helpless citizens, "the greater risk of abuse lies
in disregarding such specifically declared personal decisions
and in imposing life-sustaining procedures upon the patient
contrary to his express will." ' 7 Any concept of the sanctity of
life, and interest in the preservation of life, must also
"lencompass a recognition of an individual's right to avoid
114. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 415. The use of the term "terminally ill" is frequently and
frustratingly inaccurate. The Missouri Supreme Court described Nancy Cruzan as not
terminally ill, in contrast to Karen Quinlan and Brother Fox, the patient in In re Eichner (In
re Storar), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cer denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 415. In fact, all three patients were diagnosed as being in persistent
vegetative states, which the American Academy of Neurology, the relevant authority, states
does not constitute a terminal illness. Position of the American Academy of Neurology on
certain aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39
NEUROLOGY 125 (1989).
115. See supra note 10.
116. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 380, 529 A.2d 419, 427 (1987) (patient had a medical
durable power of attorney, the appointed agent stated that the patient had directed him to
refuse life-sustaining treatment in these circumstances, and there were nine reliable accounts
of the patient's disinclination for this type of treatment).
117. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955 (Me. 1987) (patient previously had stated orally
that people kept alive in artificially vegetative states lost their dignity, and he would rather
die) ("[a]lthough Gardner is now in a condition that prevents him from making and
communicating a decision as to his care, the trial justice found by clear and convincing
evidence after an extensive hearing that Gardner had prior to his accident made a 'declaration
of intent and desire that he not be maintained on the nasogastric tube ...."'). Id. at 952.
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circumstances in which the individual himself would feel that
efforts to sustain life demean or degrade his humanity.""'
The Missouri Court repeatedly stated that it was not
interested in making quality of life determinations."9 Yet, the
state's interest in the preservation of life permitted Missouri
to make a determination about what constitutes an acceptable
quality of life for Nancy Cruzan. In effect, the Missouri
Supreme Court found that for Nancy Beth Cruzan, a
persistent vegetative state was an acceptable quality of life.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court held:
The privacy that we accord medical decisions
does not vary with the patient's condition or
prognosis. The patient's medical condition is
generally relevant only to determine whether the
patient is or is not competent, and if
incompetent, how the patient, in view of that
condition, would choose to treat it were she or
he competent.2 '
Even an excellent prognosis, albeit irrelevant for Nancy, does
not justify overriding a competent patient's desires. 2' Choices
are for the patient, not the doctors or the state: "[i]f the
patient's right to informed consent is to have any meaning at
all, it must be accorded respect even when it conflicts with the
advice of the doctor or the values of the medical profession
as a whole."'2"
118. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635
(1986).
119. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419-20, 422, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
120. Peter, 108 NJ. at 373, 529 A.2d at 423; see also In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 355, 486
A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985).
121. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 451 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. 1989)
(competent Jehovah's Witness had lawful right to refuse blood transfusion, without which she
would probably die).
122. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 352-53, 486 A.2d at 1225 (where a minimally conscious patient
was held to have the right to forgo artificial feeding if the patient had previously made that
specific choice, or if there was some evidence that the patient would not want the feeding,
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B. The Missouri Supreme Court Unconstitutionally Refused
to Allow Patients the Right to Forgo Artificial Feeding
An attempt to justify burdening Nancy Cruzan's privacy
and liberty interests by distinguishing between tube feeding
and other forms of treatment, also will not withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Feeding undeniably has special
symbolic and emotional connotations, but subjective attitudes
have no place in a debate about whether a person should be
treated against her will:
Analytically, artifical feeding by means of a
nasogastric tube or intravenous infusion can be
seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by
means of a respirator. Both prolong life through
mechanical means when the body is no longer
able to perform a vital bodily function on its
own. Furthermore, while nasogastric feeding and
other medical procedures to ensure nutrition and
hydration are usually well tolerated, they are not
free from risks and burdens; they have
complications that are sometimes serious and
distressing to the patient.1"
Feeding tubes have been found by some states to be "intrusive
treatment as a matter of law.""124
Tube provision of feeding formula is acknowledged by
the medical profession, and most courts, as a form of care
that may be legally and ethically withdrawn if to do so is in
and the treatment would only prolong suffering or if the burdens of the treatment outweighed
the benefits).
123. Id. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236 (citations omitted).
124. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 425, 497 N.E.2d 626, 636
(1986).
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accordance with the patient's wishes.1" With the exception
of Missouri and a recent intermediate court" every court to
have considered the issue has held explicitly that tube feeding
is medical treatment that may be withdrawn.'27
The courts, holding that artificial feeding should be
treated like other medical procedures, have relied on the wide
range of medical and ethical authorities which also conclude
that it is appropriate to withhold or withdraw artificially
supplied nutrition and hydration, when to do so is consistent
with the patient's wishes."
125. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 195, 245 Cal. Rptr.
840, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert denied, 109 S.Ct. 399 (1988); McConnell v. Beverly
Enterprise-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 704-06, 553 A.2d 596, 603-04 (1989); In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954 (Me. 1987).
126. Couture v. Couture, No. 11679 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery Co., August 21, 1989)
(court held that because the Ohio durable power of attorney statute did not permit refusal
of artificial feeding, the guardianship statute could not be interpreted to permit the same
decision to be made).
127. See, e.g., Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Cal. July 28, 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 399
(1988); McConnell v. Everly Enterprises, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); In re Gardner,
534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516
N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospl. Inc., 398 Mass 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986) In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F.
Supp. 580 (D. R. I. 1988). A Washington Supreme Court decision upholding the right to
reject tube feeding was modified when one Justice changed her vote a year later. In re
Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), modified, 757 P.2d 534
(1988). She joined a concurring opinion which stated it was not necessary to reach the issue
of whether artificial feeding could be withheld since the patient did not yet require tube
feeding. The concurring opinion stated that the court should await action from the legislature
on that issue. An intermediate Appellate Court decision from Ohio looked to a recently
enacted durable power of attorney statute which does not permit refusal of artificial feeding,
and found that guardians were creations of the legislature, and should not have greater powers
than appointed agents. Couture v. Couture, No. 11679 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County
Aug. 21, 1989).
128. Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 845; McConnell, 209 Conn. at
704-06, 553 A.2d at 603-04; Gardner, 534 A.2d at 954. See, e.g., Guidelines on the Termination
of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying HASINGS CENTER at 61 (1987);
American Medical Association Counsel on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Withholding or
Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, in Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association 12-13 (1986); President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethica Medical and
Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions at 90 (1983).
Arguments that tube feeding is "normal" or "basic" care, which must always be
provided, have very little factual basis. Fearmongers who suggest that permitting the removal
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In addition to the medical and ethical consensus
surrounding this issue, through living will legislation, many
state legislatures have addressed the question of artificial
feeding. Ten statutes indicate that tube feeding can be
withdrawn under certain circumstances."2  Twelve statutes
associate it with comfort care,"3 and generally can be read as
allowing patients to forgo artificially supplied sustenance if it
is not necessary for comfort. 3 Fourteen statutes make no
mention of artificial feeding thereby permitting interpretation
so as to authorize its withdrawal consistent with medical
of tube feeding in isolated cases will lead to widescale abuse of the vulnerable elderly
deliberately overstate the facts. Indeed, the very small number of nursing home patients who
receive tube feeding is an indication of how unusual this form of treatment is. Available
estimates are that 2%-5% of nursing home residents receive tube feeding. U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Life Sustaining Technologies and the Eldery at 12 (1987).
Data from the 1985 National Nursing Home Survey indicates that approximately 26,000
nursing home residents were tube fed (2% of the total nursing home population). Industry
estimates were slightly higher 53,400 (about 4%). Id. at 297. Thus, somewhere between
26,000 and 54,000 nursing home residents are receiving tube feeding at any given time. Id
129. Alaska Rights of Terminally III Act, ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (1986); Arkansas
Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, § 20-17-20(b) (Supp. 1987);
Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(7) (1989); Idaho
Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1989); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Minnesota Adult Health Care Decisions
Act, s. 28, Chapter 145B, § 14513.03 (1989); Montana Living Will Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-9-202(2) (1987); North Dakota Act, H.B. No. 1481 § 8(3) (signed April 12,1989); Oregon
Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050(3) (1984); Tennessee
Right to Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5) (Supp. 1988).
130. "Comfort care" is synonymous with "palliative care," which has been defined as
"medical, surgical and other interventions to alleviate suffering, discomfort, and dysfunction,
whether physical or not, but not to cure." Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining
Treatment and the Care of the Dying HASTINGS CENTER at 140 (1987).
131. Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4)
(1986); Florida Life Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (West 1986);
Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-2 (Supp. 1988); Indiana
Living Wills and Life Prolonging Procedures Act, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (Bums Supp.
1989); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(5) (West 1989);
Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. HEAI.TH-GENERAL CODE ANN. § 5-605 (Supp.
1988); New Hampshire Terminal Care Document Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:211
(Supp. 1988); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 3102(4) (West Supp.
1989); South Carolina Death with Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20(2) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1103(6)
(Supp. 1988); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(3) (1985); Wyoming
Act, Wyo. STAT. § 3-22-101(iii) (1988). Oklahoma has a separate statute addressing the use
of tube feeding. Hydration and Nutrition for Incompetent Patients Act, 63 Pub. Health &
Safety § 3080 (1987).
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ethics.'32 Of the six states whose statutes provide that artificial
feeding is not a medical procedure which may be rejected
under the statute,33 three have had supplemental case law
vindicating the patient's common law or constitutional right to
forgo that treatment."3 The Maine case specifically held that
the living will statute is not the exclusive means of exercising
and defining the right to refuse medical treatment.'35
State courts have gone to considerable lengths to
interpret refusal of treatment statutes in a manner consistent
with federal and state constitutional rights. The Connecticut
experience exemplifies this interplay of judicial and legislative
input. The Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted its
Removal of Life Support Systems Act so as to provide
"functional" guidelines for the exercise of the common law and
132. Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to-10 (1984); California Natural
Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 -95 (West 1989); Delaware Death with
Dignity Act, DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 to 2509 (1983); District of Columbia Natural
Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1988); Kansas Natural Death Act,
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to -.10 (West 1989); Mississippi Withdrawel of Life
Saving Mechanisms Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1988); Nevada Witholding
or Withdrawl of Life Sustaining Procedures Act, NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to 690 (1986);
New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); North Carolina
Right to Natural Death Act, N.c. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); Texas Natural Death
Act, TExAs HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.001 (Vernon 1989); Vermont Terminal
Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); Natural Death Act of
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 -.2992 (1989); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to -.905 (1989).
133. Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-570(1)
(Supp. 1989); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5) (1985 & Supp. 1989);
Kentucky Living Will Act, KY Acts ch. 122 (H.B. 113)(1990); Maine Living Wills Act, ME.
REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § .2921(4) (Supp. 1988); Missouri Life Support Declarations Act.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wisc.
STAT. ANN § 154.01(5) (West 1989).
134. Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-570(1)
(Supp. 1989), as interpreted by Mc Connell v. Beverly Enterprises, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A-2d
5% (1989); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5) (1985 & Supp. 1989),
as supplemented by In Re Jane Doe, No. D56730 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton.County July 13,
1988); Maine Living Wills Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2921(4) (Supp. 1988), as
supplemented by In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Missouri Life Support Declarations
Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 54.01(5) (West 1989).
135. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 952 n.3 (Me. 1987) (the Maine living will act does not
limit the court's power to read Maine Common law more broadly). See also In re Jane Doe,
No. D56730 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County July 13, 1988).
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constitutional rights of self determination which have received
almost universal recognition."3 The statutory definition of "life
support systems" is "[a]ny mechanical or electronic device,
excluding the provision of nutrition or hydration, utilized by any
physician or licensed medical facility in order to replace, assist
or supplement the function of any human vital organ or
combination of organs which prolongs the dying process."'37
Nonetheless, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the
right to refuse treatment, including tube feeding, was of
constitutional dimension, and that the statute had been
enacted to provide a means of its exercise."3s The Court
stated that its Act, read in its entirety, "[i]mplicitly
contemplates the possible removal from a terminally ill patient
of artificial technology in the form of a device such as a
gastrostomy tube, but it does not under any circumstances,
permit the witholding of normal nutritional aids such as a
spoon or straw."'39  Thus, the Connectict Court made what
could be considered a strained interpretation of the statute so
as to find it consistent with a constitutionally protected right.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Florida, which has a
statute associating artificial feeding with comfort care,"4 held
that although the legislation did not permit the removal of
artificial feeding, patients nonetheless retained their
constitutional and common law rights to refuse that form of
medical treatment.' The Court noted that the Act had a
provision stating that it was supplemental to existing rights and
136. McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 705, 553 A.2d
596, 603 (1989).
137. Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-570
(Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
138. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 705, 553 A.2d at 603.
139. Id.
140. "The term 'life-prolonging procedure' does not include the provision of sustenance
or the administration of medication, or performance of any medical procedure deemed
necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain." Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (1986).
141. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App.), review denied, 492 S.
2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
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law and that since the rights at issue were constitutional, they
could not be limited by legislation.'42
Likewise, in 1987, courts in Colorado'43 and Maine"'
held that even if their state's living will acts did not authorize
removal of a feeding tube, they were cumulative with existing
law and the right to refuse tube feeding is protected by either
common law,'45 or constitutional law."* Missouri is the only
state to ignore the language in the living will statute4 7 that the
rights of the act are cumulative, and to find instead that its
legislature cut off the rights of patients to forgo treatment not
enunciated in the statute. 48
The provision of artificial feeding against an individual's
wishes can be extraordinarily intrusive and abusive treatment:
The naso-gastric tube continues to pose
significant hazards while it is in place. It may
cause vomiting and aspiration of the gastric
contents, producing a serious aspiration
pneumonia. It may irritate the mucosal surfaces,
causing bleeding, sometimes severe. Many
patients need to be restrained forcibly and their
142. Corbett v. D'Allesandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review
denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (1986).
143. In re Rodas, No. 86PR139 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mesa County Jan. 22, 1987), as
modified, Apr. 3, 1987.
144. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 952 (Me. 1987).
145. Id.
146. Rodas, No. 86PR139.
147. Nothing in sections 459.010 to 459.055 shall be interpreted to increase
or decrease the right of a patient to make medical decisions regarding use
of medical procedures so long as the patient is able to do so, nor to
impair or supersede any right or responsibility that any person has to
effect the withholding of withdrawal of medical care in any lawful
manner. In that respect, the provisions of sections 459.010 to 459.055
are cumulative.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.055 (Vernon 1990).
148. Missouri's reliance on its Living Will statute to justify foreclosing rights is
particularly ironic in Nancy Cruzan's case, because her accident was on January 11, 1983,
before the passage of the statute. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.055 (Vernon 1990) (The statute
was enacted in 1985).
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hands put into large mittens to prevent them
from removing the tube, a thought which all
patients with any degree of consciousness seem
to have. These restrained patients may develop
pneumonia and serious bedsores because of lack
of activity and fixed positions."
To carve out an exception to the individual's right to
control treatment for this one form of medical care is more
than an unreasonable burden on its exercise; in many cases,
such as Nancy Cruzan's, it forbids its exercise. As noted
above, in other circumstances, this form of treatment can be
painful and degrading. Emotional arguments based on the
symbolic importance of "food and water" which are at odds
with national medical standards and can be violent intrusions
on individual dignity do not meet "the compelling state
interest" test.150
C. The Right to Have an Individualized Decision Should Not
Be Burdened by Requiring Unrealistically Definitive Evidence
of the Patient's Wishes to Forgo Life Support
The Missouri Supreme Court implied that to be
effective, the evidence of an individual's wishes to forgo
treatment must show that the patient made a precise and
detailed decision to refuse life support under the very
circumstances at issue. 5' The result is that the Missouri Court
banned the Cruzan family from any input into Nancy Cruzan's
care. The evidentiary standards for the right to forgo
treatment cannot be so "unduly burdensome" as to preclude
its exercise.' 2  A requirement of "clear and convincing"
149. D. MAJOR, The Medical Procedures For Providing Food And Water: Indications And
Effects, BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS (page #?) (J. Lynn ed. 1986).
150. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
151. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. banc 1988) (en banc).
152. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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evidence of the patient's previously informed personal choice
will do just that.
Informed consent was developed as a doctrine to
protect the liberty interest of competent people to not be
treated without their informed permission."3  As the Missouri
Supreme Court itself noted, for incompetent patients, the
same level of information is impossible: "[i]t is definitionally
impossible for a person to make an informed decision--
whether to consent or to refuse--under hypothetical
circumstances."'54 To require such an impossible standard is
to shift the burden so that all patients must receive treatment
because they can never knowingly reject it in advance.
Some form of "substituted judgement" is the only
workable standard which protects the patient's constitutional
right to a decision: it is the "only practical way to prevent
destruction of the right."'55 The substituted judgement doctrine
"is intended to ensure that the surrogate decision-maker
effectuates as much as possible the decision that the
incompetent patient would make if he or she were
competent."'56  This approach allows a surrogate decision-
maker to decide the patient's course of care, taking into
account everything known about the patient, including his or
her personal value system, prior statements regarding medical
conditions and situations, the patient's attitudes toward the
impact of the medical condition on the family and-loved ones,
plus any and all philosophical, theological and ethical beliefs
which might be relevant.'57 Indeed, a substituted judgement
allows an approximation of personal choice and its proper
exercise could lead to a request for continued treatment, even
153. See generally P. Applebaum, INFORMED CONSENT, LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE at 135-63 (1987).
154. Cnuzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
155. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,41, 355 A.2d 647,664, cert denied sub non. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), overruled in part, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985).
156. In Re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 414, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987).
157. Id at 415, 529 A.2d at 444.
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against medical advice.
A substituted judgment that Nancy Cruzan would
choose to forgo treatment does not make the exercise of the
rights any less personal:
[If the patient's] treatment is determined solely
as a matter of medical technology [, her] life is
prolonged because it is possible, not because
anyone purporting to speak for [her] has decided
that this is the best or the wisest course ...
human beings are not the passive subjects of
medical technology. . . .While [the patient's]
coma precludes [her] participation, it is still
possible for others to make a decision that
reflects [her] interests more closely than would
a purely technological decision to do whatever is
possible. Lacking the ablitity to decide, [she] has
a right to a decision that takes [her] interests into
account.'58
158. In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 208, 345 Cal. Rptr 840,
854-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), review denied (Cal. July 28, 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 399
(1988) (emphasis added) (conservator of incompetent person in vegetative state with no hope
of recovery is authorized to decide, considering medical advice and conservatee's best
interests, that medical treatment in form of artifical life support should be withdrawn and
conservatee permitted a natural death); See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741
P.2d 674 (1987) (public fiduciary as guardian of nursing home patient in chronic vegetative
state had implied statutory authority to exercise patient's right to refuse medical treatment);
McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A2d 596 (1989) (action brought by
comatose terminally ill patient's husband and children seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
from life support services being provided to patient by private nursing home was authorized
by Removal of Life Support Systems Act); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(incompetent may exercise his or her right to privacy by substituted judgment of one acting
on his or her behalf, and guardian may be authorized to carry out previously expressed intent
of infirm person); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984) (right of patient who is irreversibly comatose to refuse extraordinary life sustaining
measures, may be exercised either by his or her close family members or by guardian
appointed by the court, on behalf of the patient under the "doctrine of substituted judgment');
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (substituted
judgment of patient in persistent vegetative state that artificial maintenance of his nutrition
and hydration be discontinued would be honored by authorizing guardian to remove ward
from present hospital to care of other physicians who would honor patient's wishes); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (where conservatee's best interests are no longer served
by maintenance of life supports, probate court may, by reason of both constitutional and
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Under the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, it is not only
medical technology which has dictated that Nancy Cruzan be
treated, but it is also the State of Missouri, usurping the role
of the family to speak for the patient.
The vast majority of state courts which have reached
the issue have protected the constitutional rights of its citizens
by endorsing family decision-making,'59 and the substituted
judgment approach."t
statutory authority, empower conservator to order removal of the life supports); In re Jobes,
108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (right of patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
may be exercised by patient's family or close friend); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985) (where a patient is deemed incompetent, a surrogate may determine when life-
sustaining treatment should be withdrawn if doing so effectuates the incompetent patient's
wishes or would be in his/her best interests under either the subjective, limited-objective, or
pure-objective test); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (husband of patient in
a persistent vegetative state had authority to remove wife's feeding tube and life support based
on patient's right to control fundamental medical decisions that affect her body, a right of
self-determination which is grounded in the liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause); In re Coyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified, In re
Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (guardian had authority
to consent to withdrawal of life-support systems where all physicians who examined ward
agreed with diagnosis that he was in persistent vegetative state with no prospect of regaining
cognitive functions).
159. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 580 (where the husband of patient in a persistent vegetative
state had authority to remove wife's feeding tube and life support based on patient's right to
control fundamental medical decisions that affect her body. The district court held this to
be a right of self-determination which is grounded in the liberties protected by the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.); McConnell, 209 Conn. at 692, 553 A.2d at 596 (action
brought by comatose terminally ill patient's husband and children seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief from life support services being provided to patient by private nursing home
was authorized by Removal of Life Support Systems Act); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 114, 660
P.2d at 738.
160. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (public fiduciary
as guardian of nursing home patient in chronic vegetative state had implied statutory authority
to exercise patient's right to refuse medical treatment); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal.
App. 3d at 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 840 (conservator of incompetent person in vegetative state
with no hope of recovery is authorized to decide, considering medical advice and conservatee's
best interests, that medical treatment in form of artificial life support should be withdrawn
and conservatee permitted a natural death); In re Severns, 425 A-2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(incompetent may exercise his or her right to privacy by substituted judgment of one acting
on his or her behalf, and guardian may be authorized to carry out previously expressed intent
of infirm person); Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 921 (right of patient who is irreversibly comatose
to refuse extraordinary life sustaining measures, may be exercise either by his or her close
family members or by guardian appointed by the court, on behalf of the patient under
"doctrine of substituted judgment"); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 417, 497 N.E.2d at 626 (substituted
judgment of patient in persistent vegetative state that artificial maintenance of his nutrition
and hydration be discontinued would be honored by authorizing guardian to remove ward
from present hospital to care of other physicians who would honor patient's wishes); In re
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Consistent with the constitutionally protected realm of
family life,'" it is those closest to the patient who should make
the treatment decisions, not the state. Family members are
usually the appropriate parties to make substituted judgment
decisions because "[a]lmost invariably the patient's family has
an intimate understanding of the patient's medical attitudes
and general world view and therefore is in the best position
to know the motives and considerations that would control the
patient's medical decisions."'t2 In this case, the Cruzans can
speak for Nancy Cruzan and assert what they believe she
would want, based on their lifetime experience with her, as
well as her own clear statements on the issue." They are
guided by her specific conversations about the life support
decisions she did encounter"' and are unanimous in their
belief that Nancy would be appalled at her condition, t" and
would choose to forgo the artificial feeding which merely
sustains her existence."
Only New York"7  and Maine," and in limited
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (where conservatee's best interests are no longer served
by maintenance of life support, probate court may, by reason of both constitutional and
statutory authority, empower conservator to order removal of the life supports); Jobes, 108
N.J. at 394, 529 A.2d at 434 (right of patient in irreversibly vegetative state to determine
whether to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may be exercised by patient's family or
close friend); Conroy, 98 NJ. at 321, 486 A.2d at 1209 (where a patient is deemed
incompetent, a surrogate may determine when life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn
if doing so effectuates the incompetent patient's wishes or would be in his or her best
interests under either subjective, limited-objective, or pure-objective test).
161. See supra notes 51-72.
162. In Matter of Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 415, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (1987).
163. The trial court found Nancy Cruzan's statements to be clear and convincing evidence
of her wishes. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). While in this
case the patient provided the requisite level of evidence of her wishes, the substituted
judgment standard is a more realistic approach in the majority of cases. Id. at 425-26.
164. Nancy's roommate testified that "she would not want to continue her present
existence with hope as it is." Id. at 424.
165. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 443. 'The trial court in no way limited its finding on Nancy's
intentions to the single conversation Nancy had with her friend Athena Comer." Id.
166. The trial judge based his conclusion that Nancy Cruzan would chose to forgo
artificial feeding on three full days of evidence. Id at 443.
167. In Re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 72 N.Y.2d 517, 534, 531
N.E.2d 607 (1988).
168. In Re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 952 (Me. 1987).
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circumstances, New Jersey, t" have required that the patient's
decision be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
before the right to forgo life sustaining treatment can be
exercised. Each of these courts specifically did so on common
law grounds alone,'7° implicitly recognizing the danger of
cutting off constitutional rights by an unreasonably stringent
evidentiary standard. New York's clear and convincing
standard has been singled out and criticized for its overly
restrictive consequences."'
The governmental interest in protecting the vulnerable
from abuse is not furthered by burdening medical decision-
making with unmeetable and unreasonable standards. The
fact that frequently there is no written information or directly
relevant oral information about patient preferences does not
169. In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (clear and convincing evidence that
the patient would have refused the treatment under the circumstances involved when the
incompetent patient is minimally conscious; less strong evidence required if there is some
trustworthy evidence that the patient would not want the treatment, and the burdens of the
patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life, and the treatment
would merely prolong the patient's suffering).
170. In Re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 72 N.Y.2d 517, 529, 531
N.E.2d 607, 612 (1988); Gardner, 534 A.2d at 951; Conroy, 98 NJ. at 346-47, 486 A.2d at
1221.
171. See In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Ct. App.), review denied, 392
Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245
Cal. Rptr. 840, 856-857, review denied (Cal. July 28, 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988);
Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 390-91 (1988); A Patient's Last
Rights.-Termination of Medical Care--an Analysis of New York's In re Storar, 46 ALBANY L.
REV. 1380 (1982); Note, In re Storar, the Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. PrrT.
L. REV. 1087 (1982). As a dissenting New York Judge recently stated regarding New York's
clear and convincing standard:
In short, [the patient] expressed her wishes in the only terms familiar to
her, and she expressed them as clearly as a lay person should be asked
to express them. To require more is unrealistic and for all practial
purposes, it precludes the right of patients to forego life-sustaining treatment
... Judges, the persons least qualified by training, experience or affinity
to reject the patient's instructions, have overridden [the patient's] wishes,
negated her long held values on life and death, and imposed on her and
her family their ideas of what her best interests require.
Westchester County, 72 N.Y.2d at 551, 631 N.E.2d at 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (emphasis
added). The restrictive nature of the clear and convincing evidence standard has the effect
of either encouraging secretive decision-making in violation of the law, forcing clear-cut cases
into court or mandating treatment for patients for whom it is medically inappropriate, but for
whom evidence at the clear and convincing level is not available. New York Times, Nov. 13,
1988, at 12, col. 1.
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mean that a decision can be avoided; it means that the
decision will invariably be to treat. Those incompetent
patients who failed to leave a clear and convincing record of
their wishes are not "protected" from bad decisionmaking by
the presumption of continued treatment. The governmental
interest in preventing abuse can be met by less restrictive
means. Families or loved ones who do not act in good faith
can be challenged, and those situations which are not resolved
within the health care institution can be taken to court.'7
Decisions to treat should not be by default, because of a
human failing to anticipate the precise details of one's medical
future. Substituted judgement allows decisions to withhold or
withdraw life sustaining treatment to be made on an individual
basis, consistent with the constitutional rights at stake.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's resolution of Cruzan v. Missouri
Department of Health'" will set the stage for the right-to-die
issue for the next decade. The dilemmas raised by this case
are not going to disappear, and the Court's decision will
determine whether the solutions will be best found in the
courts--federal or state--or the legislatures. The unanimity of
opposition from the medical establishment to the Missouri
answer to the problem implies that workable decisionmaking
procedures will be developed. Whether the federal
constitution will guarantee that those procedures respect
individual rights of privacy, liberty and self-determination
remains to be seen.
172. See generally MEYERs, MEDICAL-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 479-
at 81 (1981).
173. Supreme Court Docket No. 88-1503.
